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Abstract
Regulatory standards, such as on health and safety, may be subject to strategic bias
when a country engages in trade. Where regulation is to correct an undersupply of
quality by a monopolistic industry, if regulators do not cooperate and …rms can vary
standards, there will be a tendency to strategic overregulation, which leads to excessive,
rather than inadequate trade. When there is a mixture of horizontal and vertical quality
regulations, the pro…t-shifting motive for protection is less than the previous literature
suggests. In this case, contrary to previous …ndings, mutual recognition agreements
lead to underregulation.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the implications of quality regulations (e.g. on safety, reliability or
public health and environmental grounds) in an open economy. The existence of trade can
result in strategic distortions to regulatory policy. Much of the existing literature makes
a presumption not just that there will be a tendency in an open economy to excessive
regulation, but that this will be of a protectionist, trade-reducing kind. By contrast, I
…nd that while there may well be over-regulation in importing countries in monopolistic
industries, the e¤ects may actually be trade-increasing.
It is worth bearing in mind that much of the existing literature on regulatory protection
assumes a pro…t-shifting motive to bene…t local producers. This suggests an oligopolistic
trade structure - yet at the same time, there is little discussion of the legitimate grounds for
quality regulation which occur when an industry is monopolistic. I show that, on reasonable
assumptions, monopolistic producers will tend to produce goods at suboptimal quality. It is
perhaps worth noting that this suboptimal quality may take many forms, such as inadequate
health, safety and environmental testing, or lack of labeling. Much of this can be corrected
by regulation. However, the regulation bene…ts consumers at the expense of producers:
where the producers are foreign, there will be a bias to over-regulation, and this strategic
bias continues in the case where countries are symmetrical and product quality can di¤er
between markets. The higher regulatory standards actually increase trade volumes, at the
expense of pro…ts. By contrast, mutual recognition agreements - previously considered to be
unambiguously welfare improving - may produce underregulation, since exporting countries
will have a desire to reduce producers’ costs at the expense of foreign consumers.
This is an important …nding, since it casts doubt upon the currently popular prescrip-
tion of mutual recognition as a response to presumed regulatory bias. In many areas
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of current dispute, such as genetically modi…ed foodstu¤s, removal of ‘protectionist’ na-
tional or regional regulations may be contrary to the interests of consumers, and, con-
trary to widespread assumptions, may result in falling consumer demand and reduced
trade.
Section 2 reviews the background and existing literature on quality regulations and
trade. While policymakers and economists accept regulations as potentially legitimate, the
literature stresses they will often be greatly distorted for protectionist reasons: a conclusion
which this paper challenges when an industry is monopolistic.
In the subsequent sections I concentrate on the underprovision of quality by a classical
cross-hauling duopoly. Section 3 examines pure vertical standards: the approach is …rst to
develop a model for a simple monopoly and then to extend it to a cross-hauling duopoly with
one identical …rm in each of two identical countries, where consumer preferences are identical
and the good concerned is a substitute for other consumer goods. In these circumstances,
a vertical minimum quality standard is potentially welfare-improving. However, countries
will tend to set standards higher than optimal, and cross-country harmonisation bene…ts
welfare. A mutual recognition regime by contrast results in standards below the global
optimum.
Section 4 considers pure horizontal quality standards, imposing a resource cost on foreign
producers only. These may be imposed for protectionist pro…t-shifting, though only when
tari¤s are ruled out. However, when there is also vertical regulation, monopolistic pro…t,
and hence the pro…t-shifting motive is greatly reduced. Where countries di¤er in quality of
production, the higher-quality country may sometimes choose to raise minimum standards,
but again the circumstances and scope for this are less than the previous literature has
suggested.
In section 5, I consider the e¤ects of constraining producers to supply at the same qual-
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ity to both markets - in particular concentrating on the case where only one country is
a producer. A mutual recognition regime under imperfect competition will again result
in underregulation (and reduced trade). Where there is no such recognition, the import-
ing country will set the higher standards, but there will be a bilateral game between the
two regulators in standard setting. Compared to non-cooperation, mutual recognition will
unambiguously worsen welfare in the importing country.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and existing literature
As formal trade barriers have been reduced worldwide, there has been increasing recognition
of the importance of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) - barriers resulting from a whole
raft of national regulations and standards on labelling, product safety, labour standards,
environmental quality and so on. The EU Single Market initiative has largely been aimed
ar removing such barriers,1 and subsequent mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) have
been agreed between the EU and several other countries, as well as within the Asia Paci…c
Economic Community (see Maskus and Wilson (1), 2001). A similar awareness underlies the
articles on TBTs and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) in the GATT Uruguay
Round, and the GATS. For example the WTO Agreement Annex on Technical Barriers to
Trade Article 2 states that:
‘Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted
or applied with a view to or with the e¤ect of creating unnecessary obstacles
to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more
1One EU report in 1996 estimated that 76% of trade between member states was subject
to standards, and sectors a¤ected by regulatory trade barriers accounted for 21% of trade
and 29% of gross value added (reported in OECD, 1999).
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trade-restrictive than necessary to ful…l a legitimate objective....’
Nevertheless, there has been considerable concern that existing agreements do not go
far enough, particularly from the viewpoint of developing countries.
TBTs are much more complicated to analyse than tari¤s or quotas. Deciding to what
extent barriers are in practice legitimate or constitute ‘regulatory protection’ (the term
used by Baldwin, 2001) is not simple. First the issue of de…nition: some authors have
used very wide de…nitions of what constitutes protectionism,2 exceeding those in the WTO
Agreements.
Turning to speci…c cases, a few conclusions can be drawn from the literature. Even
regulations which apply equally to production at home and to imports may discriminate
against …rms which trade. The literature often discusses pure cost-increasing protectionist
regulation (eg Wallner, 1998 ): however, it seems unlikely substantial use would be made
of a policy which imposes high resource costs on consumers unless tari¤s, which impose a
much smaller deadweight loss, were ruled out.
Regulatory di¤erences between countries can in principle be broadly de…ned as either
horizontal or vertical. The former impose di¤erent technologies or incompatible means of
achieving a given set of results, such as plug sizes. By contrast, vertical standards are
where a regulator clearly insists that goods achieve at least a certain minimum standard of
safety or performance. In practice many regulations may have both horizontal and vertical
aspects, such as insisting that cars achieve less than certain emissions levels, and specifying
use of catalytic converters.
The most widely-recognised motive for horizontal regulation is network externalities
2Fischer and Serra (2000) de…ne a standard in a cross-hauling duopoly model as ‘non-
protectionist when it corresponds to the standard the local social planner would use if both
…rms were domestic’.
5
(see, eg Gandal, 2001). This is the situation where there is a substantial potential gain
if all consumers use a compatible technology (see e.g. Gandal, 2001). The scope for dis-
torting such a system for protectionist purposes is also clear: if technologies are not easily
compatible, the government can favour home producers.
In the case of vertical quality, the literature to date recognises three main legitimate
reasons for minimum quality controls. First, unreliable or dangerous goods may impose
externalities - the most extreme case being disease control (which underlies Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards). Secondly, purchasers of goods may not easily be able to distin-
guish the quality. In this case (see e.g. Akerlof, 1970) adverse selection may mean that bad
goods drive out the good, unless there is either e¤ective central labelling or some minimum
quality standard. The third motivation is where tastes are diverse and supply is oligopolis-
tic. In this model (see Lutz, 1996(1); Das and Donnenfeld (1989) ) mutual recognition
bene…ts both countries, particularly the lower-quality producer.
However, the above papers assume a …xed number of consumers buying at most one good
each. This means they tend to ignore a key feature of the classical monopoly/oligopoly
model: that producers can raise pro…ts by restricting output. Where quality di¤erences
substitute with diminishing returns for quantity of consumption, there may be scope for
producers to increase pro…ts at consumers’ expense by reducing quality as well as crude
quantity. This provides another legitimate reason for minimum quality standards: to correct
the underprovision of quality by monopolistic …rms.
A lack of competition may reduce quality - on a broad de…nition - in a number of ways.
These could include lack of testing and labelling or use of technological incompatibilities
to tie in users to one …rm’s products. For example, all of these criticisms are seen in the
lobbying against genetic modi…cation of foodstu¤s. The response of governments to these
will, however, depend upon the geographical structure of the industry: in the case of GM
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technology, US …rms dominate. The analysis of this paper suggests it should be no surprise
that European legislators have taken a stricter line than those in North America, leading
to a major trade dispute, notably over the separate labelling of GM foodstu¤s - however,
I would suggest it is likely, if higher labelling standards prevail, that trade will be higher
than if they do not, and that this would bene…t consumer welfare.3
More common, however, may well be industries where trade is in both directions, such
as motor vehicles, food products, clothing, petroleum products, pharmaceuticals or mobile
telephones. In all of these industries, national standards are seen as extremely important,
and yet the symmetries between countries are much greater than with GM crops. I argue
there is likely to be a bias towards over-regulation in most countries in these circumstances.
For example, there have long been complaints in the USA about supposed overregulation
of pharmaceuticals by the Food and Drugs Administration (see Friedman (1980) or more
recent work by the right-wing Cato Institute), while similar complaints can be heard from
European motor vehicle manufacturers.4 However, in this paper, I argue that these regula-
tions may actually increase trade volumes (at least when adjusted for quality), though at a
cost to manufacturers.5
The asymmetric interests cases (such as GM technology) tend to be those which crop up
most in WTO disputes, while where interests are symmetric there may be fewer disagree-
ments. However, this disguises important similarities - in both cases, importing countries
have a strategic tendency to over-regulate (though it is only in the asymmetric case that
3Nielsen and Anderson (2001) look at one scenario where some of the EU consumer demand is sensitive,
but they do not link this to utility, which may explain their rather negative assessment of EU policy.
4e.g. the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association http://www.acea.be/ACEA/20040218PressRelease.pdf
5 In the case of pharmaceuticals, it may be more accurate to say that higher imposed testing standards
would reduce the risk of consumer scares.
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this appears as protection - and then only when export and home market technologies can-
not be separated cheaply). While one may be tempted to talk of cases such as the GM
technology as representing regulatory protectionism, this is also too simple, since it ignores
the potential bias in the exporting country towards under-regulation. It is by no means
clear that mutual recognition would be welfare-improving in either case - contrary to the
drift of much of today’s trade literature.
3 A model of vertical quality regulation
I examine quality regulations as a response to underprovision of quality by a monopolistic
industry. Strictly speaking, ‘regulations’ are applied by governments, while ‘standards’ are
voluntarily agreed by industries (Sykes, 1995).6 I concentrate primarily on the former.
The method is to set up a series of theoretical models of a cross-hauling duopoly. The
optimal degree of regulation is established, as are the conditions under which actual regu-
lation di¤er from this, when there is total non-cooperation over regulation setting, or when
there is mutual recognition.
Consideration is also given to whether these regulations are in fact protectionist: for
this I prefer a relatively narrow de…nition of protection.
DEFINITION: A regulation is non-protectionist if it (i) does not reduce traded volumes;
and (ii) does not favour local pro…ts at the expense of foreign producers.
This de…nition leaves a category of trade-related strategic distortions, notably the case
where regulation causes local consumers to bene…t from increased sales (at lower cost and
reduced pro…t) by both domestic and foreign producers. In this case, there are much
6In general, a voluntary industry standard is more likely to be operated to maximise prof-
its of domestic …rms than a government regulation. However, under the former, importers
may be able to enter the market without complying.
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stronger parallels with the issue of international tax competition, rather than with tari¤ or
quota policies.
There is actually a fair amount of evidence to suggest that standards and regulations
are generally not protectionist - notably Swann et al’s (1996) British study, …nding that
increasing numbers of quantitative standards tend to be correlated with increasing volumes
of both imports and exports. Moenius (1999) had broadly similar …ndings. Also note
Greenaway and Milner’s (1986) theoretical arguements that standards are trade-promoting,
though based on rather di¤erent grounds to this paper.
In this paper I am interested in regulations which improve the minimum vertical quality
experienced by consumers. In the absence of regulation, monopoly generally reduces the
quality of goods on o¤er, but in the presence of trade there may be strategic distortions if
national regulators do not collaborate.
I start with the simplest case of a monopolist. It is assumed that consumers are identical.
I consider initially a single country using a partial equilibrium approach, concentrating on
just one good. Firms produce output with two features, quality, Q, and quantity, Y . I
assume initially that the total cost of production, C, is a linear function of Q and Y , with
a and b denoting the linear scalars
C = aY + bQ: (1)
I assume homothetic demand for quality and output, so that we can convert quality and
output to a measure of ‘quality-adjusted output’, X. For simplicity I assume X is a Cobb-
Douglas aggregate of Y and Q
X = Y ¯Q1¡¯; (2)
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where ¯ is a scalar which lies between zero and unity.
We can also convert the price per unit of output P into a price per unit of quality
adjusted output, PX .
Consumer utility depends upon consumption both of quality-adjusted output, X , and
of a residual aggregate of other goods, G = ¹M ¡ PXX (where ¹M is an exogenously given
endowment) in a quasilinear fashion—thus eliminating income e¤ects. For simplicity the
utility from consuming the good in question is assumed to have an elasticity ´ with respect
to consumption—implying a constant elasticity of demand, ¡² = ¡1=(1 ¡ ´):
U = ¹M ¡ PXX + °X´: (3)
3.1 Monopoly equilibrium under quality regulation
I begin with a quality regulated monopolist, whose pro…t mark-up is a decreasing function
of demand elasticity ². I assume ² exceeds unity, which implies 0 < ´ < 1.
I start by considering the behaviour of an unregulated monopoly, denoted superscript
U . For a given level of X = XU , we can obtain the cost-minimising value of Q(= QU ). This
equals
QU = ((a=b)(1 ¡ ¯)=¯)¯XU ; (4)
and hence yields a constant marginal cost of raising X,
MCU = (a=¯)((a=b)((1 ¡ ¯)=¯))¯¡1: (5)
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Now introduce a regulation …xing Q ¸ QR (where the superscript R denotes a regulatory
minimum quality). In practice, if QR> QU then the …rm will choose Q = QR. It is also
assumed that the regulator only sets a minimum quality standard: there is no regulation
of volume supplied or price (this may be a more realistic assumption for the oligopoly case
considered later).
By contrast with the unregulated case, marginal cost is now a function of Q and X,
MCR = (a=¯)(ÂR)(1¡¯)=¯; (6)
where Â denotes the output/quality ratio X=Q. Di¤erentiating this with respect to QR
shows that d=dQ(MCR) is negative: hence, as Q is increased by regulation, the marginal
cost of quality-adjusted output X will fall, given a downward-sloping demand curve. This
leads to our …rst result.
Proposition 1 If a monopolist is constrained to produce to a higher standard than he would
otherwise choose, the marginal cost of increasing quality-adjusted output is less than when
the choice of quality is unconstrained.
This can be shown in …gure 1 (Appendix 1), which deals with the …rm’s choice of crude
output Y . Given free choice, the …rm will choose (QU ; Y U) on the ray QU=Y U= k. However,
regulation prevents Q < QR It follows that for quantities of quality-adjusted output up to
XF the …rm is forced to incur higher cost C than it would freely choose for a given level
of quality-adjusted level of output X. However, as output increases the total cost line
approaches the ray QU=Y U= k. This suggests that imposing a quality standard of QR> QU
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means the marginal cost of X is less than it would be if the …rm freely chose Q and Y ,
up to the point where X = XF . The reason total cost is higher is because the minimum
standard e¤ectively imposes a …xed cost on the …rm.
Assuming a constant demand elasticity, the monopolist will set a …xed proportional
markup over marginal cost. Hence the introduction of QR will lead to lower prices (at least
when quality-adjusted), and higher sales, at least as long as the standard is not set so high
that the monopolist chooses to exit the market. This leads to our next result:
Proposition 2 A quality constrained monopolist will sell more quality-adjusted output at
a lower quality-adjusted price than an unregulated monopolist, and this output rises mono-
tonically with the quality standard as long as the …rm continues to produce.
X is related to QR by setting marginal cost equal to marginal revenue and solving:
XR= (¯°´=a)¯=(1¡¯´)(QR)(1¡¯)=(1¡¯´) : (7)
This con…rms that for positive ¯; ° and ´ and 1 > ¯´ > 0 , XR is increasing monoton-
ically with respect to QR.
This is illustrated in …gure 2. For X < XF the new marginal cost curve, MCR(X),
lies below the old one, MCU (X). Consequently the monopolist will now increase quality-
adjusted output to equal XR rather than XU as before. It can also be seen fairly easily that
consumer surplus is increased. By di¤erentiating (3) we can see that since ´ lies between 0
and 1, consumer surplus increases monotonically with X, and since Proposition 2 shows X
increases monotonically with QR we derive
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Proposition 3 Consumer surplus rises monotonically with the minimum quality.
If the monopolist is foreign, an interesting result follows from Proposition 3:
Proposition 4 If the monopolist is foreign, a regulator maximising domestic welfare will
set the highest quality standard at which the …rm does not exit the market.
Normally we would assume this to be the …rm’s reservation level of QR corresponding
to ¼R = 0: The optimal standard when the monopolist is foreign is
QRF= ((a=b)((1 ¡ ¯)=¯))(1¡¯´)=(1¡´)(¯°´=a)1=(1¡´): (8)
If the monopolist is domestic, the situation is rather di¤erent. Using the superscript
D to denote this case, WD = UD+¼D . We have set up the model such that changes in
regulatory quality, QR, only a¤ect UD via changes in quality-adjusted sales, XD: Hence we
can write
dWD=dQR ¡d¼D=dQR= (dUD=dXD)(dXD=dQR): (9)
We know that for 0 < ´ < 1; these two right hand terms are positive - hence the
marginal gain in social welfare from raising QR is always greater than the marginal gain
in private pro…t to the …rm. We also know that ¼D decreases with QR. We can conclude
that at the unregulated monopoly quality, the marginal social gain to raising QR will be
positive.
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By double di¤erentiating (7) with respect to QR we know that the rate of increase in
output with respect to the regulation quality will decelerate. Likewise by di¤erentiating
(3), the increase in consumer utility with respect to output also decelerates when 0 < ´ < 1
Hence the di¤erence between marginal social and private net gains will decline as QR rises.
It seems reasonable to expect that at some point the marginal loss in pro…ts from raising
QR will exceed the marginal gain to consumers, unless pro…ts have already fallen to below
their reservation level at this point.
In this case there will be a social optimum for setting QR when the monopolist is
domestic, and this level QRD > QU the unregulated monopoly level. If at this level QRD,
the pro…ts of the …rm are still greater than their reservation level, then the regulator will
not impose as high standards as if the …rm were foreign. This is important, since, once
we allow that some consumption is foreign-produced, there will often be an incentive on
the regulator to raise quality standards beyond what is globally optimal, imposing extra
costs on the foreign producer(s), but bene…ting local consumers. Whether QRD > QRF is
an empirical matter depending on parameter values.
This can be summed up:
Proposition 5 The quality standard chosen by a domestic welfare maximising regulator
when the producer is foreign exceeds that chosen when the monopolist is domestic, unless
parameter values are such that the latter produces zero pro…ts.
Propositions 1-5 have shown that a single unregulated monopolist will undersupply
both quality and crude quantity, but that when quality regulation is introduced there can
be a bias to excessive regulation where the monopolist is foreign.
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3.1.1 More complicated cost structures
The above analysis has relied upon a very simple, linear cost structure, as shown in equation
(1). It is worth noting that this result carries through to more general cost structures
C = C(Y;Q), so long as raising quality lowers the marginal cost of producing quality-
adjusted output, i.e.
d=dQ(dC=dX) < 0: (10)
For example, where X is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate, but raising quality has e¤ects on
both …xed and variable costs, i.e.
C = aY + bQ + dQY; (11)
where a, b and d are non-negative, it is relatively straightforward to show that the conditions
in equation (10) hold so long as
a(¯ ¡ 1) + d(2¯ ¡ 1)Q < 0: (12)
Clearly, for 0 < ¯ < 1 and d = 0 (the case in the previous section) this holds. Also when
¯ < 1=2 it will hold. For ¯ > 1=2 and d > 0; (12) will be satis…ed if the unregulated
monopolist’s output,
QU < (a=d)((¯ ¡ 1)=(2¯ ¡ 1)): (13)
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It is possible, though not trivial, to show that an unregulated monopolist will always
choose less than this level of quality - hence quality regulation, at least at the margin,
will cause the monopolist to increase output.7 It may be noted, however, that while the
regulator will only increase Q;this will not exceed the point where (12) is satis…ed: whether
this will a¤ect the interaction with trade depends on parameter values.
For the rest of this paper, I will retain the simpler formulation, for expositional reasons.
3.2 Quality regulation in a cross-hauling Cournot duopoly
I now assume that, instead of a monopolist, the industry contains two identical …rms:
f = f1and f2, set in countries c = c1 and c2 respectively. All consumers in both countries
have identical tastes, and the two …rms produce goods which are perfect substitutes, with
identical production functions.
As before, consumers’ utility in c1 depends on total consumption, which I now denote
Z1, where Z1 = X1;1 + X2;1, the aggregate of the quality-adjusted sales Xf;c of the two …rms
to country 1.
Utility is given by
U1 = U + °Z
´
1 ¡ PX1Z1; (14)
where PX1 is the price of the quality-adjusted output in country c1, which is the same for
both suppliers given their outputs are perfect substitutes.
As before, X1;1 and X2;1 are Cobb-Douglas aggregates of quality Qf;c and crude quantity
7For proof, dC=dQ = ¯(d=dQ(dC=dX)) + b: Hence if b is positive and dC=dQ is negative, then
d=dQ(dC=dX) is negative.
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Yf;c, and cost Cf;c is a linear function of Y f;c and Qf;c.8
We are crucially assuming that …rm f chooses its quality to supply to each market
separately, and that quality chosen to supply to c1 has no e¤ect on the costs of quality in
c2.
Since the cost side of the model is unchanged from that of the monopoly above, we can
proceed by analogy. When a …rm is unregulated the marginal cost of increasing quality-
adjusted output Xf;c is constant, as given by (5) above. Likewise, when country c1 sets a
higher quality standard than the unregulated duopoly would choose, marginal costs fall as
(QRf;1=Xf;1) rises, as indicated by equation (6).
The demand side is somewhat more complicated. For maximum utility, consumption
is to the point where marginal utility of Xf;c equals quality-adjusted price.
For maximum pro…t, …rm f will set marginal revenue in market 1 equal to marginal
cost. We make the Cournot-Nash assumption that each …rm f assumes its rival g will keep
quality-adjusted output Xg;c constant in response to changes in f ’s output.9 Calculating
marginal revenue for a given level of output, and assuming the two …rms are identical we
can easily establish combined output for an unregulated duopoly is set at a level somewhat
greater than in a monopoly. Setting marginal revenue for each …rm equal to price, and
assuming the …rms are identical,
8 Strictly speaking, if the values of scale parameters a and b in equation (1) were invariant
with the number of …rms, the smaller …rms in a duopoly case would be producing a lower
quality than the monopolist in the …rst case. However, a slightly modi…ed formulation (eg
where costs are a function of output and quality per plant, and the number of plants) would
return the model to the classical features where a monopoly results in lower quality and
quantity. Since in this paper I am only interested in cases where the number of …rms is
…xed, I have retained the linear fomulation in (1) for simplicity, but it is worth bearing in
mind that a and b are not invariant with the number of …rms.
9The alternative Bertrand-Nash duopoly, where goods are identical, produces the unin-
teresting result that prices are bid down to marginal cost.
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MRf;1 = ((1 + ´)=2)°´Z´¡1: (15)
Hence
ZU1 = (°´(´ + 1)=2)
1=1¡´(MC)1=´¡1; (16)
w here MC is the constant value of marginal cost as in equation (5).
For a regulated industry, the e¤ects of moving from a monopoly to a regulated duopoly
are somewhat more complicated:
ZR1 = ((¯=a)°´(´ + 1)=2)
¯=1¡¯´(2QR1 )
(1¡¯)=(1¡¯´): (17)
Importantly, equation (17) implies that the combined duopoly sales, ZR1 , rise with
respect to QR1 . Therefore, as in the monopoly case, consumer utility UR1 will rise monoton-
ically with QR1 . Hence, the same basic results hold as in the monopoly case:
Proposition 6 If a Cournot duopoly of identical …rms is regulated to produce to a higher
standard than they would otherwise choose, the marginal cost of increasing quality-adjusted
output is less than when the choice of quality is unconstrained.
Proposition 7 A regulated duopoly as in Proposition 6 will sell more quality-adjusted
output at a lower quality-adjusted price than an unregulated duopoly, and this output rises
monotonically with the quality standard as long as the …rms continue to supply the market.
Proposition 8 Consumer surplus with a quality regulated Cournot duopoly rises mono-
tonically with the minimum quality standard.
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For optimal choice of quality standards, the analysis can proceed along similar lines to
where there is a monopoly. Total welfare in country c1 is
W1 = U1 + ¼1;1 + ¼1;2; (18)
where ¼1;1 is the pro…t made by f1 in c1, and ¼1;2 is the pro…t f1 makes on sales to c2.
The implication here is that, only the domestic …rm’s pro…ts (ie half total pro…ts) will
be taken into account by the regulator. Hence quality standards will be set too high, if the
regulators do not cooperate.
More formally, welfare in c1 is assumed to depend only on consumer surplus and f 01s
domestic pro…ts:
dWR1=dQR1 = (dU
R
1 =dZ
R
1 )(dZ
R
1 =dQ
R
1 ) + d¼
R
1;1=Q
R
1 > d¼
R
1;1=Q
R
1 (19)
It follows by analogy with the monopoly case that, that if …rms are forced to produce
above their unregulated choice of quality, pro…ts will fall. This should lead a non-cooperative
regulator to choose either that standard at which the marginal cost to f1 alone equals the
marginal loss of consumer surplus, or else the point at which …rms exit the market.
Compare this to a globally optimal solution. In this case, global welfare, WG is the
sum of W1 and W 2. Di¤erentiating this with respect to QR1:
dWG1=dQR1 = (dU
R
1 =dZ
R
1 )(dZ
R
1 =dQ
R
1 ) + 2d¼
R
1;1=Q
R
1 ; (20)
assuming (by symmetry) that d¼R2;1=dQ
R
1 = d¼
R
1;1=dQ
R
1 .
Once more it will be worth increasing QR1 beyond Q
U
1;1, the quality which maximises
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private pro…ts. However, this time we take into account the decline in both …rms’ prof-
its: consequently global welfare peaks with respect to QR1 rather faster than country c1’s
welfare, and the regulator will set a more modest standard, unless again the global welfare-
maximising standard is still high enough to cause …rms to exit.
Proposition 9 The quality standards chosen in an identical cross-hauling Cournot duopoly
when the regulators do not cooperate exceed the global optimum, unless parameter values are
such that the latter produces zero pro…ts. This overregulation bene…ts consumers at the
expense of both …rms.
The point at which the …rms exit the market can be deduced by analogy to (8). Again,
whether or not this sets a practical ceiling to the level at which the regulators set standards
is an empirical matter.
3.3 Mutual recognition
I now examine a mutual recognition agreement, under which each country will set its own
quality standard for production, but will accept any goods produced by the other country’s
producer which are acceptable to its regulator. With mutual recognition, we assume the
regulator in c1 assumes f1 will sell goods at quality QR1 in both markets, but at the same
time, f2’s product standards will not change in either market. This means that the regulator
is assumed to calculate that only f1 will raise its sales in country 1 in response to rising QR1 .
Consequently, the marginal increase in combined sales in country 1, ZR1;is only half as big
as in the case where there is no mutual recognition. However, changes in welfare will include
the change in pro…ts of f1’s exports to c2. Raising regulatory standards lowers those pro…ts,
while the bene…t to foreign consumers is not taken account of by the domestic regulator in
c1 . More formally, we can say (by symmetry) d¼R12=dQ
R
1 = d¼R11=dQ
R
1 : Consequently, the
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marginal welfare e¤ect to country 1 of changing QR1 is
dWMR1 =dQ
R
1 = dWG=dQ
R
1 ¡(1=2)(dUMR1 =dZMR1 )(dZMR1 =dQR1 ): (21)
By contrast, the increase in global welfare from raising QR1 will include the gains to
consumer utility in c2 from higher quality of exports from c1. Since we can again write (by
symmetry) dUMR2 =dZ
MR
2 = dU
MR
1 =dZ
MR
1 and dZ
MR
2 =dQ
R
1 = dZ
MR
2 =dQ
R
1 ; it follows that the
marginal welfare gain to c1 from raising standards is less than the global gain, and that as
a result standards under mutual recognition will be set lower than optimal.
Proposition 10 The quality standards chosen by the country regulators in an identical
cross-hauling Cournot duopoly where there is mutual recognition will be lower than socially
optimal.
As a …nal point on these models of pure horizontal regulation it is worth noting the
following, which follows from Propositions 6-10:
Proposition 11 Non-cooperative setting of pure vertical standards in a cross-hauling
Cournot duopoly where consumers and …rms are identical does not alter market shares,
and increases trade volumes compared to the global optimum. Consequently on de…nition
1 it should be considered strategic overregulation rather than regulatory protection. Mutual
recognition leads to strategic underregulation.
The broad conclusion is that, when identical …rms possess monopoly power and are
spread across various countries, if regulators do not cooperate they will choose excessive
standards. Contrary to the received wisdom these are trade-increasing. However, if the
21
regulators agree mutual recognition, they will then be tempted to undercut each other’s
standards, leading to a decline in both quality and trade to below the optimum.
4 Vertical and horizontal quality regulation
The discussion above has concentrated on vertical regulations, which raise some measure
of quality experienced by consumers for all goods within an industry. By contrast, much of
the literature on TBTs focuses on pure horizontal regulations, which discriminate between
suppliers in one country against another, or between those using one technique rather than
another, and which do not directly a¤ect consumer utility.
A horizontal TBT involves imposing a resource cost on imports. Any changes in import
share could equally be achieved by an equivalent tari¤, which would by contrast raise revenue
for the importing country. It follows that pure horizontal TBTs are only likely to appeal
where tari¤s are ruled out (eg by trade agreements), or where TBTs are regarded as less
visible, and hence less likely to provoke retaliation. Again, it is worth bearing in mind
that in a perfectly competitive model, horizontal TBTs just lower national welfare, since
they impose a resource cost which worsens both the importing and the exporting countries’
terms of trade.
Horizontal TBTs may, however, appeal to regulators in four circumstances, where the
alternative of tari¤s is ruled out: (i) given monopolistic pro…t, there may be a pro…t-shifting
incentive to raise domestic suppliers’ market share, to raise their pro…ts, even when this
involves imposing a cost on consumers. (ii) Agglomeration economies may mean that a
country which raises output by imposing TBTs can either lower production costs or raise
local factor rents. (iii) There may be agency capture so that the regulator represents local
producers rather than the importing country as a whole . (iv) H orizontal legislation may
to some extent be inevitable where there are network externalities.
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In this paper I consider the …rst of these motives only.
4.1 Pure horizontal technical barriers to trade
Consider …rst a pure horizontal TBT in the non-cooperative Cournot duopoly model where
there is no vertical regulation. I assume the horizontal TBT adds a cost of T per quality-
adjusted unit of the good imported into country c1, while having no e¤ect on the vertical
quality experienced by consumers. By contrast, it does not a¤ect the costs to domestic
suppliers. It is assumed that tari¤s are ruled out by agreement.
From (4), where there is no vertical regulation, marginal costs of producing X are
constant at MCU . However, since we have introduced the horizontal TBT, marginal costs
for f2 selling to c1 are now
MCH2;1= MC
U+T (22)
where the superscript H denotes the case with horizontal barriers.
If we assume …rm f’s market share is µHf;1, we can show that the …rm’s marginal revenue
declines with its market share. We can also show that the quality-adjusted price facing
consumers in c1 rises with the market share for the domestic producer f1. To be precise, if
we de…ne Tf;1= 0 for …rm 1 and T for …rm 2, then for each supplier, this relationship is
given by
MRHf;1 = °´(Z
H)´¡1(1 + (´ ¡ 1)µHf;1) ¡ Tf;1 (23)
It follows that, for the e¤ects of the introduction of a pure horizontal TBT of T per
quality-adjusted unit output X on imports from f2 to c1; f2’s marginal costs will be raised,
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and consequently, its market share will fall (which raises its marginal revenue, according
to equation (23)). Correspondingly f1’s market share will rise, so its marginal revenue will
fall somewhat. But, since marginal costs are constant, f1 too will restrain production. The
resulting equilibrium will give lower total sales (and hence a higher Px) but a higher market
share to f1 than initially.
For the welfare implications, consider total welfare in country 1, which consists of
consumer surplus plus f1’s pro…ts at home and abroad. We assume ¼1;2, the pro…t made by
the domestic …rm on its exports, is una¤ected by any TBTs introduced by c1. Consequently,
this term disappears when we di¤erentiate W1 with respect to T1. This leaves:
dWH=dTH1 = ©1 + ©2 + ©3 + ©4 (24)
where ©1 = (MUH1 ¡PxH1 )dZH1 =dTH1 (25)
©2 = +µH1;1(Px
H
1 ¡MCU)dZH1 =dTH1 (26)
©3 = ¡(1 ¡ µH1;1)ZH1 dPxH1 =dTH1 (27)
©4 = +ZH1 (Px
H
1 ¡MCU )dµH1;1=dTH1 (28)
©1 is the di¤erence between consumer price and supplier price times the change in
consumption. Since we are assuming there are no indirect taxes, this should equal zero. ©2
is the home …rm’s share in the total change in home sales times its pro…t margin (this will
be zero or negative as sales fall when T1 is introduced). ©3 is the cost of the increased price
to consumers of the initial volume of imports from f2. This also yields negative welfare,
since the price of imports rises. ©4 represents the pro…t shift, since µH1;1 , the home …rm’s
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share, will rise with TH1 , and this will yield extra pro…ts, if the pro…t markup ¹H1;1 is positive.
This pro…t-shifting gain is the only potential welfare gain from introducing the horizontal
TBT in our model, and yet it will only lead to protection when there is a pro…t markup
which is positive and large enough to outweigh the two terms ©2+©3:
Proposition 12 Where basic production costs of the two …rms are the same, a regulator
will only introduce a pure horizontal barrier where pre-barrier pro…ts are positive and the
pro…t shift outweighs the loss of consumer surplus and the e¤ect on domestic pro…ts of a
shrinking total home market.
Since the introduction of vertical quality standards in the absence of cooperation or mu-
tual recognition has already been shown (Proposition 9) to either reduce or totally eliminate
pro…ts, we deduce:
Proposition 13 Where basic production costs of both …rms are the same, if the regulator
also introduces vertical regulations, the incentive to introduce horizontal TBTs is either
reduced or completely eliminated.
4.2 Cost di¤erences between countries
Even ‘pure’ vertical standards may of course have a protectionist element if production
costs di¤er. In this case, the country with the lower marginal costs of raising quality may
have incentives to raise its vertical quality standards above the socially optimal level for
what we are de…ning as protectionist, rather than simply strategic reasons: higher minimum
standards may raise the market share of the domestic producer at the importer’s expense.
To see how this can happen, consider the case where the two …rms are initially unregu-
lated and produce quality-adjusted output X at the same price. However, …rm 2 has higher
marginal costs of raising quality and lower marginal costs of raising crude output Y than
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its rival. Formally, b2=Ãb1, in which case raising quality is more expensive for …rm 2 than
…rm 1 if Ã > 1.If unregulated marginal costs are the same, it is easy to show that
a2 = Ã(¯¡1)=¯a1: (29)
In this case, in the absence of regulation (denoted with superscript D) the less quality-suited
…rm 2 will set a lower quality than …rm 1:
QD1 =Q
D
2 = Ã
1=¯ (30)
To analyse what happens in this case, …rst, consider a situation where the globally optimal
regulatory standard QR1
¤ in country 1 lies between QD2 and QD1 . In this situation, raising
QR1 at the margin will raise the costs of the importing …rm f2, lowering its market share
and pro…ts, but not a¤ect the costs of f1. Since in this situation demand will shift towards
f1, its pro…ts will actually improve as QR1 is raised (up to the point where QR1 = Q
D
1 ). In
the absence of international cooperation, the regulator will only take account of the (rising)
consumer welfare and f1’s rising pro…ts, and hence will keep raising QR at least to QD1 ,
even if this is above the globally optimal level. In this case, QR
1
> QR1 ¤ and we clearly have
not just strategic distortion but (on our narrow de…nition) protectionism as well, since the
higher standard reduces trade and bene…ts local pro…ts at the expense of foreigners.
What about the case, though, where QR¤1 > QD1 ? It is fairly easy to show that, once
QR1 is raised above Q
D
1 ; market shares of the two …rms cease to change any more. The ratio
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of marginal costs of the …rms beyond this point is given by
MC1=MC2 = (a1=a2)(µ1;1=(1 ¡ µ1;1))(1¡¯)=¯ ; (31)
which is constant, and since prices depend only on nmarginal costs and pro…t markup, the
shares of the two …rms and ´, once QR rises above QD1, further rises in QR will not a¤ect
…rms’ market shares, with marginal costs and prices rising at proportionally the same rate
for both …rms, so there is no pro…t-shifting motive. Hence the next proposition:
Proposition 14 Where …rms’ marginal costs of raising quality di¤er, there may be a
pro…t-shifting motive for the regulator in the country with the lower marginal cost of raising
quality to raise vertical standards above the global optimum. However, this motive only
exists if the global quality optimum lies below what the domestic …rm in that country would
choose if unregulated.
It follows from the above discussion that, while a pro…t-shifting motive for introducing
cost-increasing pure horizontal TBTs is conceivable, the circumstances in which this is likely
to occur, and the degree to which it is likely to apply are greatly reduced compared to the
implications of previous studies (eg Baldwin, 2001, Wallner, 1998).
5 Prohibitive costs of providing di¤erent standards to di¤er-
ent markets
We have so far assumed producers are able to supply at di¤erent qualities to di¤erent
markets. Generally speaking this is the case (for example, the same producers can provide
left- and right-hand drive cars, or TV sets for sale in the UK and USA), though usually at
a cost. It is worth considering the e¤ects of the extreme alternative case, where the cost of
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supplying di¤erent qualities to di¤erent markets is prohibitive.10 In this case, if a …rm is
to supply both markets, it must produce at the same quality for both. This does produce
somewhat more complicated solutions: I shall concentrate on the case where there are two
countries but just one producing …rm, in the exporting country.
Under autarky, the optimal quality standard in the exporting country would be given
by
d¼d=dQd + dUd=dQd = 0; (32)
where d refers to the exporting country’s domestic market. The …rst term is negative, the
second positive.
I shall assume consumers’ tastes are identical and that the cost structure is such that
this is also the global optimum standard Q¤d.
Now consider a mutual recognition agreement. The analysis proceeds much as above:
the exporting country regulator sets quality standards for both countries, and since he will
take account of the (negative) e¤ect of regulations on the exporting …rm’s pro…ts, but not
of the (positive) e¤ect on foreign consumers’ utility, he will seek to set
d¼d=dQd + dUd=dQd + d¼f=dQd = 0: (33)
Given d¼f=dQd < 0 and d2¼f=dQ2d < 0 it is fairly trivial to show that this will result in a
standard eQd lower than the socially optimal Q¤d. In general, we would expect the larger the
10An example being the claim by US soya producers that separately labelling GM and non-GM soya for
sale abroad would be prohibitively expensive.
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export markets relative to the domestic market, the greater the incentive to the regulator
to set suboptimal standards.
Now consider what happens where there is no mutual recognition, but non-cooperation
between the regulators. Assume the exporting country regulator has initially set Qd. When
the regulator in the importing country raises its quality standards Qf , it does not care
that the foreign …rm has to raise quality in both countries (and so makes less pro…ts than
with a lower standard). Hence the regulator will choose to raise quality, up to the point
Qf = Qd + 'ffQdg, at which the …rm would exit the market. 'f is given by solving the
equation
¼dfQdg = ¼dfQd + 'fg + ¼ffQd + 'fg: (34)
In this case, the point at which the …rm exits the export market will depend upon Qd, and
upon the relative size of the two markets - a …rm will much more readily abandon a small
market, implying that, ceteris paribus, 'f will be less the smaller the export market.
This produces a bargaining game between the two countries’ regulators, the outcome of
which will involve a degree of uncertainty. If the importing country regulator sets its
standard above Qf = Qd+'ffQdg, the …rm will not be prepared to export. The exporting
country’s regulator, in turn, will not set Qd higher than the level QHd where
UdfQHd + 'ffQHd g) + ¼dfQHd + 'ffQHd gg + ¼ffQHd + 'ffQHd gg = UdfQ¤dg + ¼dfQ¤dg;
(35)
in other words it will only go above Q¤d so long as it makes enough pro…ts from sales abroad
to compensate it for the loss of pro…ts at home. For this reason QHd is likely to be higher the
larger the foreign country. Standards in the importing country will exceed QHd by 'ffQHd g:
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At the other extreme, the minimum level the exporting country’s regulator would ever set
is QLd , which satis…es
d¼dfQLd + 'ffQLd gg=dQd + dUdfQLd + 'ffQLd gg=dQd + d¼ffQLd + 'ffQLd gg=dQd = 0;
(36)
where the only di¤erence from the mutual recognition level eQd is given by the fact that the
foreign regulator will maintain somewhat higher quality (and hence lower pro…ts) abroad.
Between these two extremes, the outcome quality levels will be determined by bilateral
bargaining, re‡ecting the bidding process and the sizes and institutions of the countries. It
is not possible to come to a …rm conclusion as to whether the outcome will exceed or fall
short of the globally optimal regulation level.
The …rm conclusions we can come to from this section are
Proposition 15 Where only one country produces the good, mutual recognition will produce
quality below the global optimum, and the importing country will be unambiguously worse
o¤ than under non-cooperation.
Proposition 16 When goods cannot be produced at di¤erent qualities for di¤erent markets
and there is no cooperation, goods will be produced to the standard set in the importing
country, which will exceed that in the exporting country. The latter however will set a
ceiling on how high the importing country can set standards. There will be a bargaining
game to determine the two standards.
Looking at the current stando¤ between the EU and the USA over separate labelling of
GM foodstu¤s, the block to trade looks like a disequilibrium phenomenon while negotiation
proceeds. The EU, as the expected importer of GM soya, would clearly be better setting
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testing and labelling standards independently. The USA by contrast would like a mutual
recognition agreement, under which it could export GM soya with suboptimal safeguards.
The current stando¤ will presumably continue until there is a clear understanding of whether
mutual recognition will be enforced.
5.1 Quality standards with income di¤erences
A further implication of the basic model investigated above is that, in a country where
incomes are relatively lower, consumers will tend to prefer not just lower quantities but
also a lower quality of output, whereas in wealthier countries there will be a preference
for higher-quality goods. This raises important issues especially when countries of di¤erent
income levels choose to trade with one another (as, for example, with Mexico trading with
the USA and Canada, or with the new Central and European accession states trading with
existing EU members).
If there is no cost at producing goods of di¤erent quality for di¤erent markets, then
suppliers will tend to produce lower-quality goods for the poorer countries and higher-
quality goods for the richer ones. Perhaps the more interesting case is where …rms are
unable to vary their quality between countries. In this case, a producer in the poorer
country (denoted CP ) will have to choose whether to supply goods to the richer country
(CR) at a higher standard than it would wish to supply at home. The minimum standard
in the richer country will partly re‡ect consumer preferences there for higher quality, but
also potentially a strategic desire to force oligopolistic producers abroad to raise production
standards. If we assume CR is a far larger market than CP , and that geographical distance
and formal trade barriers are low (as is the case in NAFTA or was the case in the pre-
enlargement Europe Agreements with the Central and Eastern European Countries), then
the export market to CR will loom large in the business plans of the producer in CP , so
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that it will be prepared to forego substantial pro…ts at home in order to continue to export
to CR.11In these circumstances, manipulation of quality standards by the regulators in the
richer countries may well raise trade volumes (by forcing the poorer country producers to
produce goods more to the tastes of rich country consumers) but at the possible cost of
reducing utility in the poorer country, where cheap, low-quality goods cease to be available.
Low income members of CP would particularly be hit by the quality-upgrading to enter
richer country markets.
In these circumstances, entry of poorer countries into a single market with the richer
country/countries could have interesting repercussions, with considerable relevance to cur-
rent debates in the EU. Firstly, where the single market imposes central harmonisation
of standards it is likely the richer country would be keen to ensure voting rules ensure
its ability to maintain high quality standards is not compromised by admitting new mem-
bers.12Secondly, there may be even greater reluctance on the part of existing richer members
to admit poorer members where mutual recognition is involved, unless the poorer members
agree in advance to impose certain minimum standards to avoid quality downgrading.
6 Conclusion
The WTO Agreements recognise the danger of regulatory protection when setting national
standards, but also acknowledge legitimate reasons for such standards. The idea that regula-
tions are trade reducing seems to result from counterfactual studies which implicitly assume
standards are simply cost-increasing. The conclusions of this literature are contradicted by
11By contrast, where trade costs and/or the income di¤erentials between the two countries are much larger,
as between, say some LDCs and the richer countries, …rms in the poorer country may simply not export at
all.
12The EU Single Market employs a combination of harmonisation and mutual recognition - see Brenton
et al, 2001.
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the (largely ignored) empirical studies such as Swann et al (1996) which show increasing
use of standards tends to go with increased trade. At the other end of the literature is a
small amount of theoretical work, mainly based on the Shaked/Sutton di¤erentiated con-
sumers with oligopoly model, which indicates that strategic policy distortions are likely in
the presence of trade, and suggests that mutual recognition will increase welfare.
Unlike previous studies, this paper looks at more classical monopolistic distortions.
Unregulated monopoly power leads to suboptimal quality as well as quantity of goods
supplied. Regulation increases both quantity and quality available, and there is therefore a
valid economic reason for quality regulation of a form which actually increases trade.
It is further shown that where some suppliers are foreign, there is an incentive for the
domestic regulator to set an excessive minimum standard, reducing pro…ts but bene…ting
consumers. This strategic distortion, however, does not conform to traditional ideas of
protectionism. In many cases it will actually lead to excessive trade volumes, and does
not necessarily involve bias against foreign producers. This conclusion holds even when
producers can only produce a single quality for both markets.
While mutual recognition removes this strategic distortion (and so, paradoxically, can
actually reduce trade), unlike previous approaches this study shows that there is an incentive
for regulators to allow lower than optimal domestic standards, to boost exporters’ pro…ts
at the expense of foreign consumers. Hence mutual recognition is not necessarily welfare-
improving.
The paper also …nds an incentive to impose pure cost-increasing standards on foreign
…rms, as Wallner, 1998 and Baldwin, 2001 have indicated, but only where tari¤s are ruled
out. Also, the gains to an importing country from this kind of horizontal barrier are greatly
reduced when vertical regulations are also taken account. In many circumstances, there
may be little, if any foreign pro…t for a protected domestic …rm to capture, and, very
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likely, not enough for the pro…t-shift to outweigh the losses to local consumers. Even mixed
horizontal/vertical barriers may only prove attractive in limited circumstances.
As for assessing current regulations: actually disentangling how far these regulations
really comprise regulatory protection may not be an easy task. This paper casts a somewhat
sceptical light on the tendency to assume that regulations are trade-impeding and should
be tackled under the auspices of the WTO or other trade bodies. Assessment of the welfare
e¤ects of harmonisation or mutual recognition should not be carried out on the assumption
that regulations are purely cost-increasing, since the above analysis indicates that if regu-
lators are seeking to maximise national welfare it is unlikely they will introduce barriers of
this kind, and indeed national variations in standards may genuinely re‡ect di¤erences in
national preferences with regard to risk, quality etc. To infer, as some studies have done,
that a high proportion of Tre‡er’s (1995) ‘missing trade’13 is due to horizontal regulatory
barriers is probably incorrect. Indeed, the absence of international cooperation is actually
likely to lead to over-regulation of standards which increases, rather than reducing, trade
volumes.
It is likely that regulation will be higher in sectors which are dominated by imports:
this is more likely to be ostensibly for reasons of raising consumer utility, though where the
cost of such regulations falls largely upon foreign …rms there is an incentive to over-regulate
(there is a parallel with the tax competition literature). However, this over-regulation will
probably increase, not decrease trade volumes.
In the light of these arguments, it may be that policymakers have been too ready to
view quality regulations simply an issue of protection, to be dealt with through international
13 ‘Missing’ in the sense that trade generally falls far short of what gravity models predict
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trade negotiations. It may be more appropriate to view it as an issue of international policy
coordination, to avoid a natural bias towards overregulation where production is global but
regulation is national, but also to avoid a bias towards underregulation (which may show up
as inadequate testing or labelling or the deliberate introduction of product incompatibilities)
where standards are set primarily by the exporting country.
This latter point implies a good deal of scepticism is needed regarding the fashionable
idea that mutual recognition is necessarily welfare-improving. When standards are reduced
by producers for classical oligopoly reasons, introducing mutual recognition may lead regu-
lators to side with their own producers, and cause a downward bias in quality. This e¤ect
has been missed in previous studies. Mutual recognition needs to be assessed on a case-by-
case basis: there are certainly circumstances in which it can reduce welfare at least in the
importing country and possibly global welfare.
Policy distortions will also be a¤ected by the degree of ‡exibility producers have to
change speci…cations to supply di¤erent markets. Where there is little such ‡exibility, then
there may be a bargaining game between di¤erent countries in setting regulations between
those (primarily importing) countries who favour over-regulation and those (exporters) who
favour underregulation. Trade may temporarily be obstructed as part of this bargaining
process (as in the GM foods case in recent years), but to interpret this just as protection on
the part of the importing countries is to miss the strategic bias in policies of the exporting
countries, as well.
A few cautions should be added at this point. There are aspects of trade under im-
perfect competition which require some further investigation. For example, many industry
standards are produced either by industry associations or by the industry in conjunction
with government bodies (the latter in the cases where compulsory regulations are applied).
However, it would be too simplistic to assume that regulatory standards are fully voluntary
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and protectionist14 by the industry players themselves: …rst, they may be simply a response
to the threat of legislation. Moreover, there is a question why a government should rubber
stamp welfare-reducing standards. However, there may well be scope for analysing the reg-
ulatory process as a principal-agent game, where the government desires higher quality for
its citizens but only the …rms concerned possess the relevant information.
There is also some scope for analysing the e¤ects of limit pricing by a colluding oligopoly
- depending upon whether national standards make entry easier or harder. Both these topics
go somewhat beyond the scope of this paper.
14There is a possible argument that quality standards are a means of imposing higher …xed costs on new
entrants. However, against this, centrally imposed standards may increase product compatibility, hence
making entry easier.
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Appendix 1: Figures
Figure 1: Imposition of a minimum quality standard QR by a regulator. Qu and Yu are the
unregulated quality and quantity.
Quality Q
Quantity
Y
C=CM
X=XM
QR
YF
X=XU
C=CU
Qu/Yu is
constant
Figure 2: choice of quality-adjusted output under a regulatory minimum quality standard.
Marg Cost MC,
Marg Utility MU
Quality-adj
Output X
XM X* MR
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APPENDIX 2: Derivation of equations (For the bene…t of the referees)
Equations (4)-(5):
CU = aXU1=¯QU (¯¡1)=¯ + bQ
dCU=dQU = 0 ==> ((1 ¡ ¯)=¯)aXU1=¯QU¡1=¯ = b
QU = ((a=b)(1 ¡ ¯)=¯))¯XU
CU = aXU1=¯(((a=b)(1 ¡ ¯)=¯))¯¡1XU(¯¡1)=¯ + b(((a=b)(1 ¡ ¯)=¯))¯XU
= XU(a=b)¯¡1((1 ¡ ¯)=¯)¯¡1(a + b(a=b)((1 ¡ ¯)=¯)
= XU(a=¯)((a=b)((1 ¡ ¯)=¯))¯¡1
Equation (6):
CR = aXR1=¯QR(¯¡1)=¯ + bQR
dCR=dXR = (a=¯)XR(1¡¯)=¯QR(¯¡1)=¯
Di¤erentiating dCR=dXR with respect to QR
d=dQR(dCR=d) = (a=¯)((¯ ¡ 1)=¯)XR(1¡¯)=¯QR¡1=¯ which will be negative for
0 < ¯ < 1;XR;QR > 0 and a > 0: Hence raising the regulatory quality lowers
marginal
costs. Further, if the regulator sets the same regulatory quality as the monopolist
would
anyway choose unconstrained, (XR/QR) = ((a=b)(1 ¡ ¯)=¯))¡¯: Substituting into
(6)
we get dCR=dXR = (a=¯)((a=b)((1 ¡ ¯)=¯))¯¡1; so marginal costs are the same
for a
regulated as an unregulated …rm when quality is set at the unregulated level, but
falls
as QR is raised.
Equation (7):
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Setting marginal utility equal to marginal cost
°´XR´¡1 = MCR
= (a=¯)(XR=QR)(1¡¯)=¯
°´(XR)(¯´¡1)=¯ = (a=¯)(QR)(¯¡1)=¯
and rearrange
Equation (8): set marginal cost equal to average cost
MCRF = (a=¯)(XRF =QRF )(1¡¯)=¯
ACRF=aX
RF (1¡¯)=¯QRF (¯¡1)=¯ + bQRF=XRF
==>(a=¯)(XRF=QRF )(1¡¯)=¯ = a(XRF =QRF )(1¡¯)=¯ + bQRF =XRF
(QRF =XRF )1=¯ = (a=b)(1 ¡ ¯)=¯
But from equation (6) XRF= (¯°´=a)¯=(1¡¯´)(QRF )(1¡¯)=(1¡¯´)
So QRF ((¯°´=a)¡¯=(1¡¯´)(QRF )(¯¡1)=(1¡¯´) ) = ((a=b)(1 ¡ ¯)=¯)¯
(QRF )(1¡´)=(1¡¯´)((¯°´=a)¡1=(1¡¯´) = ((a=b)(1 ¡ ¯)=¯))
and rearrange
Equation (12):
Y = X1=¯Q(¯¡1)=¯
Hence C = aX1=¯Q(¯¡1)=¯ + bQ + dX1=¯Q(2¯¡1)=¯
dC=dX = (a=¯)X(1¡¯)=¯Q(¯¡1)=¯ + (d=¯)X(1¡¯)=¯Q(2¯¡1)=¯
d=dQ(dC=dX) = (a(¯ ¡ 1)=¯2)X(1¡¯)=¯Q¡1=¯ + (d(2¯ ¡ 1)=¯2)X(1¡¯)=¯Q(¯¡1)=¯
= (1=¯2)X(1¡¯)=¯Q¡1=¯(a(¯ ¡ 1) + (d(2¯ ¡ 1)Q)
When this equals zero, a(1 ¡ ¯) = d(2¯ ¡ 1))
Equation (13)
A monopolist will minimise costs for a given level of output (unless constrained).
Hence dC=dQ = 0:
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But dC=dQ = a((¯ ¡ 1)=¯)X1=¯Q¡1=¯ + b + d((2¯ ¡ 1)=¯)X1=¯Q(¯¡1)=¯
==> (1/¯)X1=¯Q¡1=¯(a(¯ ¡ 1) + d(2¯ ¡ 1)Q) = ¡b
But the LH term is ¯(d=dQ(dC=dX)):
Hence for ¯ > 0 and b > 0, d=dQ(dC=dX) < 0:
It follows that raising Q would, at the margin, lower marginal costs (and so lead a
monopolist to increase output.
Equation (15)
Revenue Rf;1 = Xf;1Px
But Px = °´Z´¡11 = °´(X1;1 + X2;1)´¡1
Rf1 = °´(X1;1 + X2;1)´¡1Xf;1
dRf1=dXf1 = °´(´ ¡ 1)(X1;1 + X2;1)´¡2Xf;1 + °´(X1;1 + X2;1)´¡1
Equation (16):
MRf;1 = °´Z
´¡2
1 ((´ ¡ 1)Z1=2 + Z1)
set MR = MC and rearrange equation (11) Z´¡11 = ((1 + ´)=2)¡1(°´)¡1MC
Equation (17):
since MCRf;1=(a=¯)(X
R
f;1=Q
R
1 )
(1¡¯)=¯ = (a=¯)(ZR1 =2QR1 )
(1¡¯)=¯
ZR´¡11 = ((1 + ´)=2)¡1(°´)¡1(a=¯)(Z
R
1 =2Q
R
1 )
(1¡¯)=¯
ZR((´¡1)¯¡(1¡¯))=¯1 = (ZR1 )(¯´¡1)=¯ = ((1 + ´)=2)¡1(°´)¡1(a=¯)(2QR1 )(¯¡1)=¯
Equation (23):
given perfect competition we can relate the price facing consumers to those
received by the two producers
PxHf;1 = Px
H
1 + Tf where Tf = 0 for …rm 1 and T for …rm 2
MRHf;1 = d=dXf;1(Px
H
f;1X
H
f;1) = (dPx
H
1 =dXf;1)Xf;1 + PxH1 ¡ Tf
PxH1 = °´Z
H´¡1
1
Hence (dPxH1 =dXHf;1)X
H
f;1 = °´(´ ¡ 1)µHf1ZH´¡11
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MRHf;1 = °´(´ ¡ 1)µHf1(ZH1 )´¡1 + °´(ZH1 )´¡1 ¡ Tf
Equation (29):
Unregulated marginal costs (from equation (5))
MC1 = (a1=¯)((a1=b1)((1 ¡ ¯)=¯))¯¡1 = (a2=¯)((a2=Ãb1)((1 ¡ ¯)=¯))¯¡1 = MC2
(a2=a1)¯ = Ã¯¡1
Equation (30):
Unregulated quality chosen by supplier f is QDf = (((af=bf)(1 ¡ ¯)=¯))¯XDf
But we assume unregulated costs for the two …rms are initially the same, so they
produce the same quantity. Hence
QD1 =Q
D
2 =(a1=b1)=(a2=b2) = (a1=a2)=(b1=b2) = Ã(1¡¯)=¯=(Ã
¡1
)
= Ã1=¯
Equation (31):
Marginal cost of the lower quality …rm 2 is given by MCR2 = (a2=¯)(X
R
2 =Q
R
2 )
(1¡¯)=¯
Set QR2 = Q
D
1
Then MCR2 = (a2=¯)(X
R
2 =Q
D
1 )
(1¡¯)=¯
MC1=MC2 = (a1=a2)(X
R
1 =X
R
2 )
(1¡¯)=¯
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